How Discrimination Impacts Sociopolitical Behavior: A Multidimensional Perspective

Kassra AR Oskooii
University of Washington

The conventional wisdom regarding the impact of discrimination on political behavior is that the perception of prejudiced treatment motivates individuals to take political action. This study challenges this common conception by demonstrating that the source of discrimination can play a significant role in whether perceived or experienced injustice leads to activism or withdrawal from sociopolitical life. Drawing from political science and social psychology literature, this study provides a new perspective on the potential effects of discrimination on a relatively new marginalized group in the United States. Specifically, an important distinction is drawn between political (systematic) and societal (interpersonal) discrimination in analyzing the sociopolitical behavior of American Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The results will hopefully encourage scholars to take a deeper look at the nexus between discrimination and democratic engagement, which is an important, complex, multidimensional, and understudied topic.

Over the course of American history, *inegalitarian* ideologies and practices have played a powerful role in shaping the American political landscape (Smith, 1993). Whether in everyday social interactions or decisions concerning matters related to sovereignty, citizenship, civil liberties, immigration, and access to social, legal, and economic resources, various groups have been, and continue to be, stigmatized and denied equal standing (Kim, 1999; Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Ngai, 2004; Smith, 1993). Yet, despite the historical and present prevalence of prejudice in both social and political domains, the direct relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior is still relatively understudied. Discrimination is rarely the focal point of the most comprehensive studies related to the civic and political engagement of minorities. Consequently, our understanding of how discrimination affects the political behavior of marginalized individuals is limited.

The few studies that have explicitly focused on this important topic suggest that heightened awareness of unfair treatment may motivate individuals from various racial and ethnic backgrounds to take part in civic and political life for expressive or substantive purposes (e.g., Barreto & Woods, 2005; Cho, Gimpel, & Wu, 2006; Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramirez, 2007; Sanchez, 2006). This perspective, however, only presents one side of a multifaceted phenomenon, as existing investigations have either not distinguished between different types of discrimination or have primarily focused on how hostile political contexts shape behavior without paying much

attention to societal expressions of exclusion.[1] Epidemiological research conducted over the past three decades problematize the implied link between discrimination and sociopolitical activism by discovering that intolerance has alarming mental health consequences for numerous minority groups. Specifically, social psychologists have found that individuals exposed to mistreatment and intimidation in social/interpersonal contexts on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation exhibit feelings of inferiority, insecurity, powerlessness, and depression (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Dion & Earn, 1975; Finch, Kolody, & Vega, 2000; Whitbeck, McMorris, Hoyt, Stubben, & LaFromboise, 2002).

Considering these adverse psychological outcomes, it is imperative to draw a distinction between two overarching and conceptually distinct sources of discrimination—societal and political—and assess their direct impact on democratic participation separately. In what follows, it will be argued that the extent to which individuals are motivated to participate in the American democracy is, to some degree, dependent on the type of discrimination to which they are exposed. Empirically, it will be demonstrated that the perception of political discrimination is significantly linked to participation in various sociopolitical activities while the perception of societal rejection is associated with political acquiescence or behavioral alienation. Although existing work suggests that the awareness of undesirable social, economic, and political changes is usually met with defiance, it is important to note that any act of resistance is more likely to occur among individuals who not only have the material resources, but also have the psychological fortitude to confront the status quo or unwelcomed changes. People who feel rejected due to persistent negative interpersonal encounters may be less inclined to engage in politics because they are likely to internalize negative evaluations, resulting in a lowered sense of self-worth, confidence, or belonging (Krieger, 1999). One consequence of such harmful sociopsychological mechanism is a state of "false consciousness," the feeling that one is incapable of bringing about social and political changes (see Jost, 1995). As such, it is not surprising that spending one's limited time and resources on the political process may become only an afterthought for the most marginalized members of society—that is, those who perhaps not only view the political system with pessimism due to the perceived institutional inequalities that their group faces, but also vividly experience intolerance in their own communities perpetuated by rank-and-file members of the society.

To provide a more nuanced depiction of how discrimination impacts behavior, the following study will also delineate between conventional/mainstream and ethnic-specific sociopolitical activities. Combining traditional political participation measures—such as voting or contacting a public official—with "ingroup" or "ethnic-based" activities can muddle the relationship between discrimination and democratic engagement. While this study suggests that societal discrimination may decrease the propensity of behavioral engagement, experiences of marginalization (political or social) may, nevertheless, bring individuals from similar racial, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds together. Drawing from social identity theory, it will be argued that marginalized individuals increase involvement with their own immediate community (ingroup) even if they feel disempowered, dissatisfied, or disengaged from mainstream politics due to their negative interpersonal experiences.

To test the proposed claims, the American Muslims population has been selected for analysis.[2] Muslim-Americans were chosen for two principal reasons. The first reason is contextual in nature in that American Muslims have been subjected to extensive levels of prejudice since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Cainkar, 2002; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006). As such, the widespread discriminatory treatment of Muslims in airports, places of business, mosques, community groups, and neighborhoods across the country provide an opportunity to sufficiently evaluate the impact of not just political, but

---

[1] In circumstances in which both measures of political and societal discrimination were accounted for, their impact on civic and political participation were not separately measured. On the contrary, various types of discrimination measures, when available, are often combined to form all-encompassing (broad) discrimination scales.

[2] In this study, the terms "American Muslims" or "Muslim-Americans" are used to refer to both citizen and noncitizen Muslims residing in the United States.

also societal, discrimination on engagement. Second, despite the sharp rise in prejudice toward American Muslims in the past decade, scholars have largely ignored the consequences discrimination has had on this population's involvement in sociopolitical affairs.

Three specific reasons underscore why more research on Muslim-Americans is needed. From a normative standpoint, one of the core principles in a democratic society is the equal consideration of the welfare and preferences of *all citizens* (Verba, 2003). If some citizens are unable or unwilling to participate in politics due to sociopolitical alienation, they may be denied access to crucial resources and opportunities. Further, a focus on the current status of Muslims in the United States is valuable because it can shed light on broader issues concerning prejudice in America, which are relevant to other minority groups. Drawing parallels or recognizing dissimilarities between Muslim-Americans and other groups such as African Americans, Asian-Americans, and Latinos can increase our overall understanding of how discrimination impacts political behavior in specific, and democratic longevity in general. And lastly, it is important to note that Islam—the fasted growing religion in the world—is rapidly increasing the number of its adherents in the United States (Jamal, 2005; Leonard, 2003). The number of Muslims in the United States is projected to increase from an estimated 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million by 2030, meaning that Islam will surpass Judaism and become the second largest religion behind only Christianity (Pew Research Center, 2011). All these reasons suggest that more research on this rapidly growing population is not only increasingly necessary, but also useful in better understanding how discrimination impacts democratic engagement.

The present article is divided into five sections. First, a detailed definition of societal and political discrimination will be offered. Next, a review of existing scholarship on the potential consequences of discrimination on political behavior and psychological well-being will be presented to set the theoretical framework. Then, a deeper explanation for why American Muslims were selected for this research endeavor will be given followed by a detailed discussion of the data, methodology, and empirical findings. Before concluding, the proposed theory will be further evaluated by exploring the connection between discrimination and an indicator of psychological well-being.

Defining Political and Societal Discrimination

Before evaluating discrimination's effect on sociopolitical agency or lack thereof, it is important to clearly define what constitutes political and societal discrimination and explain why this specific distinction is useful.[3] The word *discrimination* on its own refers to drawing a distinction—by judgment or action—in favor or against a *person* or *group* based on various sociocultural or biological identifiers such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexuality (OED Online). To "discriminate against" is the act of treating a person as a second-class citizen or inferior, distrustful, or undeserving of equality. Discrimination is multidimensional and can be perpetrated by a diverse array of actors. Individuals (e.g., neighbors, colleagues, or classmates), nonstate institutions (e.g., religious and private organizations), and the state and its institutions (e.g., public schools, criminal justice system, or law-making bodies) can all be culprits of domination (Krieger, 1999). Unfair treatment may be expressed in a multitude of ways. These include: overt (or blatant/direct), covert (or subtle/indirect), legal, and illegal methods (Essed, 1991; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Krieger, 1999). The potential responses to prejudice can be described as protective or destructive. In general, subjects of discrimination either engage in active resistance or internalize oppression (Krieger, 1999). Resistance ranges from actively challenging the status quo through political participation or joining civic organizations to creating safe spaces for the purpose of self-affirmation. In contrast, victims of discrimination may engage in

---

[3] In defining discrimination, this article draws heavily from Nancy Krieger's (1999) *Embodying Inequality: A Review of Concepts, Measures, and Methods for Studying Health Consequences of Discrimination*. Her work on conceptualizing discrimination is extremely important and has provided a key source of motivation for this study.

behaviors that are detrimental to their overall well-being. Targets of discrimination may internalize acts of subjugation by accepting their inferior status (refraining from any measures of defiance), engage in denial, and/or cope with their negative experiences by abusing legal or illegal substances (Gibbons, Gerrard, Cleveland, Willis, & Brody, 2004; Guthrie, Young, Williams, Boyd, & Kintner, 2002; Krieger, 1999).

Nearly all types of discrimination can be divided into two overarching, yet conceptually distinct categories: *political* or *societal*. Although the usage of these terms varies, *political discrimination* (or institutional or systematic discrimination) typically refers to discriminatory laws, campaign messages, policies, or practices carried out by state or private institutions and/or their affiliated actors. Within the U.S. context, examples range from Jim Crow and anti-immigration laws to the general racialization of minorities in political campaigns (e.g., portraying African Americans as unintelligent, lazy, and prone to violence). *Societal discrimination* (or interpersonal discrimination) refers to discriminatory interactions between individuals in public or private settings. The most common example is character assault, such as being treated as inferior, dishonest, dangerous, or unintelligent. Individuals can experience such discrimination while walking to work or school, shopping, eating at a restaurant, or attending public events (Essed, 1991). Another less common but certainly more severe example of societal discrimination is physical threat or assault.

Historical and contemporary examples of political discrimination such as Jim Crow laws, California's mid-1990s anti-immigration propositions, the infamous 2001 USA Patriot Act, or Arizona's SB 1070 have a number of commonalties that set them conceptually apart from societal/interpersonal types of discrimination. Political discrimination is often formal, systematic (wide scale), organized, and *group-oriented* in nature—and gets perpetuated at the macrolevel. Policies, laws, rules, and campaign messages are intended to influence a group of people based on specific or broad categories such as race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, income, or disability. More specifically, political discrimination can be viewed as frames or projects that attempt to interpret, represent, or explain group dynamics and reorganize or redistribute various resources along sociocultural markers, characteristics, or lines (Haney-Lopez, 2000; Omi & Winant, 1986). In contrast, various forms of societal discrimination such as character assaults, threats, or vandalism are often informal (not systematic), *individually* targeted hostility disseminated by *rank-and-file members* of society not affiliated with larger systems or institutions. Societal discrimination or exclusion occurs primarily at the microlevel, often directly experienced on the street, in shops, at schools, or other public and private spaces where individuals interact with one another. It typically refers to overt acts of discrimination by one person against another. Political and societal discrimination should be measured and analyzed separately precisely because they capture distinctly dissimilar dimensions of discrimination in general, which is a broad, complex, and multifaceted concept.

Starting with this distinction is also useful for another important reason: these concepts, while distinct, capture a number of themes that other scholars have considered when examining discrimination. When scholars refer to "group-oriented" discrimination, they typically refer to cases of institutional, systematic, or "political" discrimination. Likewise, an analysis of "individual-level" discrimination usually denotes "societal" or "interpersonal" discrimination, although this is not always clear. At times, individual discrimination is understood as the type of awareness or severity of discrimination, such as directly experienced verse indirectly perceived, rather than the source of discrimination, which could be political or societal. This study eliminates any confusion by clearly defining societal discrimination as discrimination between members of the public, which is, more often than not, directly experienced rather than indirectly perceived. In contrast, political discrimination means systematic, group-oriented discrimination, which can be directly experienced or indirectly perceived depending on the context. For instance, a Muslim-American person can indirectly perceive the post-9/11 security policies to be targeting his group by simply paying attention to the news without having personally experienced any racial profiling. In this case, personal experience

with policy implementation is not necessarily a prerequisite to perceiving discrimination in the political arena.

Although the examination of discrimination on sociopolitical behavior is the focus of this study, less recognizable, but perhaps equally consequential, acts of prejudice are also prevalent and deserve to be mentioned and studied. Krieger (1999) accurately points out that while some experiences with discrimination are obvious, others are more invisible and hard to recognize. This is especially the case in the post-civil-rights era, where outright expressions of bigotry have become increasingly taboo (Kinder & Sears, 1981). One may be denied a mortgage, an apartment, a business permit, admission to a club, or given a lower salary without realizing that the basis for such actions are related to factors associated with one's race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the effect of covert discrimination on democratic engagement, future research must also take into consideration the consequences of subtle or even unrecognizable bigotry. Nevertheless, it is certainly clear that the aforementioned covert forms of discrimination contribute to the income and education gap between Whites and minorities, which, in turn, help explain some of the aggregate political participation disparities based on race over time.[4]

A New Theoretical Perspective

Reasons for Participation: Discrimination as a Motivator?

The study of political behavior has received extensive attention by social scientists. Several major theories have been developed to explain why some individuals engage in politics whereas others do not. The conventional view is that political activity is a function of at least three factors: individual-level resources, recruitment, and psychological orientations. For instance, based on Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's (1995) civic voluntarism model, Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) account of political mobilization and participation, and standard socioeconomic status models (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978), we know that older citizens of higher socioeconomic strata and those who are asked to take part in politics participate more.[5]

While these theories explain *who* is most likely to participate, they do not, however, sufficiently explain *why* and under *what circumstances* individuals are likely to spend their time, skills, and resources on the political process. For most people, political activity seems rather remote considering the many responsibilities and distractions of everyday life (Dahl, 1961). Despite having an abundance of resources, some individuals may not take interest in politics (Gamson, 1968). Hence, scholars have determined that in addition to attitudinal determinants of political activism—such as strength of party attachment, amount of political trust, interest, and efficacy, and the strength of people's issue attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; McCluskey, Deshpande, Shah, & McLeod, 2004; Verba et al., 1995)—political context plays a critical role in understanding psychological motivations behind political involvement. Specifically, a key impetus for political mobilization is the awareness of undesirable political conditions or political threat. Research demonstrates that individuals are especially likely to take action when posed with a direct or indirect threat

---

[4] Political participation gaps are especially prominent when one compares turnout rates between Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics without controlling for socioeconomic resources.

[5] Specifically, higher levels of education and income translate into more political participation through acquiring civic skills and connections to social networks that foster mobilization. For immigrant populations, individual-level factors such as nativity, length of time in the United States, language proficiency, and racial identity are significant predictors of political participation (Ramakrishnan, 2005; Wong, 2000). Further, institutional/group-based resources such as political parties, civic organizations, unions, and places of worship are also important catalyst to political activism (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Harris, 1994; Putnam, 2000; Tate, 1993; Verba et al., 1995; Wong, 2006).

toward their material self-interests, well-being, or values (Campbell, 2003; Marcus, Neuman, & McKuen, 2000; Miller & Krosnick, 2004).

Extending the political threat theory to members of marginalized groups, it becomes apparent that undesirable social, economic, and political conditions have also motivated racial or ethnic minorities to take political action. Historically, African Americans have shown a long tradition of confronting political apparatuses of racism despite considerable barriers to participation. Even when highly dissatisfied with the political process and alienated from the political system, many African Americans have mobilized and challenged unfair, immoral, and illegitimate government practices to gain equality and inclusion in the United States (Dawson, 1994; Matthews & Prothro, 1966; McAdam, 1982; Parker, 2009). In fact, shared racial identity, as well as historical and contemporary experiences of unequal treatment, have fostered a sense of group commonality and linked fate among African Americans, translating into political cohesiveness on a number of policy issues (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993).

Responses to anti-immigration initiatives also provide illuminating examples of how perceived political discrimination is linked to political mobilization. Pantoja et al. (2001) have found that recently naturalized Latino immigrants in California's anti-immigration (propositions 187, 209, and 227) environment of the 1990s had high rates of voter registration and turnout, whereas those who naturalized in more neutral political contexts, such as Florida, had much lower levels of participation.[6] Similarly, several other studies have demonstrated that anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation in various settings is associated with political action among multiple immigrant-based populations (Barreto & Woods, 2005; Cho et al., 2006; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramirez, 2007).

Although political scientists have, to a certain extent, empirically investigated how individual behavior is shaped by the apprehension of politically threatening circumstances, an analysis of how socially hostile contexts impact behavior is inadequately explored.[7] Societal discrimination has primarily been the focus of social psychologists. This is evidenced by a growing body of quantitative population-based studies of various racial and ethnic groups, which have drawn a direct link between social exclusion and mental health impairments (see Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007; Paradies, 2006; Pascoe & Richman, 2009; Williams & Mohammed, 2009). For example, in an examination of mental well-being among Southeast Asians in Canada, Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, and Rummens (1999) discovered that experiences of interpersonal racial discrimination were correlated with self-reported depressive symptoms. Societal discrimination (e.g., whether the respondent has been called derogatory or insulting names, treated disrespectfully, or excluded from various social activities) has also been linked to feelings of inferiority among Native American, Mexican-American, and African American adults (Banks, Kohn-Wood, & Spencer, 2006; Finch et al., 2000; Whitbeck et al., 2002). Research further demonstrates that individuals stigmatized by dominant group members tend to internalize negative evaluations, which can subsequently translate into lower levels of self-esteem (Leary, Terdal, Tambor, & Downs, 1995; Verkuyten, 1998).

Overall, the common theme that emerges from these studies raises an important question for the study of discrimination and democratic engagement. If experiences with interpersonal discrimination can lead to feelings of powerlessness, insecurity, or unhappiness, can such negative psychological mindsets impact sociopolitical behavior? Will victims of societal discrimination be less inclined to get involved in mainstream avenues of political engagement than those who have not fallen victim to prejudicial treatment? In what follows, the present study aims to answer these questions by analyzing the Muslim-American experience with both societal and political discrimination since the terrorist

---

[6] Proposition 187 rolled back state services for undocumented immigrants (1994); Proposition 209 sought to end affirmative action in public institutions (1996); and Proposition 227 ended bilingual education programs in public schools (1998).
[7] One notable exception is Schildkraut's (2005) research on discrimination, identity, and Latino political behavior. She finds that experiences with interpersonal discrimination could actually lead to behavioral alienation.

attacks of 9/11. Before that, the next section will provide a concise theoretical framework to further explain why experiences with or perceptions of political and societal discrimination may have dissimilar impacts on sociopolitical behavior.

The Proposed Relationship Between Discrimination and Sociopolitical Behavior

When faced with injustice, various minority groups have displayed higher rates of political participation. Several viable reasons help explain why heightened awareness of political discrimination may facilitate participation. The most compelling answer is the desire to bring about change or prevent adverse policies to be considered or implemented. Discrimination in the political sphere can lead people to develop strong feelings of group attachment, linked fate, or group consciousness as citizens are treated differently based on certain sociocultural *group-based* markers (Dawson, 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981; Olson, 1965; Stokes, 2003; Tate, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972). One product of group attachment is the emergence of a "collective orientation" (Garcia, 2003), which makes it more likely for individuals to challenge institutions that violate notions of equality and fairness embedded within the American political culture. Political discrimination is also group oriented in nature, which means ethnic-based organizations can more easily mobilize individuals around salient group issues (Wong, 2006). Beyond instrumental reasons, individuals may also engage in politics for emotional and expressive purposes. For some, participation sends a symbolic message, serving as a valuable tool to constructively express anger, frustration, or discontent.

H1: American Muslims who perceived post 9/11 security policies to be implemented discriminatorily (aware of political discrimination) are more likely to report increased involvement in politics than those who did not perceive any discrimination (see Figure 1).

While perceptions of political discrimination could serve as a mobilizing force, the opposite may be true for individuals exposed to societal discrimination. The aforementioned epidemiological studies highlighted that low self-esteem, hopelessness, and depression among various minority groups is a byproduct of experiences with societal rejection. Whether one is intentionally ignored while waiting to be served at a restaurant, verbally threatened at school, or physically assaulted on the way to work, the accumulation of these negative encounters are likely to make one feel devalued, unhappy, or insignificant. As a consequence, targets of societal prejudice may be more pessimistic than their counterpart to believe that they can effectively challenge inequality or that their voices are even heard (Jost, 1995). Without feeling that one is capable of bringing about social or political change, citizens will likely become indifferent to or disheartened with the democratic process. A plethora of research demonstrates that among various political outlooks, the belief that one's actions can have a meaningful impact on political outcomes is a particularly important factor shaping political involvement (e.g., Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Almond & Verba, 1963; Guterbock & London, 1983; McCluskey et al., 2004; Michelson, 2000).[8]

When one considers the political mobilization of African Americans prior to and during the civil rights movement, it is often assumed that African Americans from various backgrounds challenged White supremacy. However, this is not the case. Gary Marx finds that Blacks raised in the deep South were much less likely to confront oppression than those who were raised in the North because they did not possess the "...necessary psychological outlook [morale, sophistication, and

---

[8] Although no research has explored the specific link between societal discrimination and efficacy, a few studies suggest that mental health impairments such as symptoms of depression are linked to lower self-efficacy (Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2000; Smith & Betz, 2002). Specifically, depression and self-efficacy are related in that "depression is associated with beliefs that one will not be able to achieve important goals in important spheres of life" (Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997, p. 268.

Figure 1. The hypothesized nexus between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior.

pride in self] to support and encourage militancy" (1967, p. 93). Similarly, Parker (2009) finds that the reason Black servicemen, more than other southerners, risked physical harm and economic hardship to contest White supremacy was because their military experiences furnished them with a sense of entitlement and increased self-confidence. Deprived of such psychological strength, their behavior would have likely mirrored other similarly situated southerners. What this suggests is that individuals who feel especially marginalized or rejected due to their negative societal experiences may decide to adapt to the exclusionary circumstances and avoid challenging their deprived position in society.

H2: American Muslims who report having experienced societal discrimination will be less likely to participate in mainstream political activities than their counterparts.

Although victims of societal discrimination may not feel inclined to take part in political activities possibly due to feelings of powerlessness, there is some indication that they will be more likely to seek out members of their own community for reaffirmation. According to social identity theory, the recognition of prejudiced treatment by the dominant group can increase identification with one's ingroup (Tajfel & Tuner, 1986). The Rejection-Identification Model also posits that members of marginalized groups cope with the pain of prejudice by increasing identification with their disadvantaged group (Branscombe et al., 1999). Stigmatization increases the desire for group attachment because such ingroup identification may be the best possible approach for feeling accepted. A devalued young Muslim may gravitate towards the local Islamic center because it is a safe and welcoming environment

that can help stigmatized individuals to cope with feelings of rejection.[9] Muslim-Americans who perceived political discrimination may likewise seek to engage in their ethnic or religious-based community organizations. The mosque, just like churches, can be a great place to not only talk about salient political issues, but also to organize people to improve the group's position in society.[10]

H3: Individuals who perceived political discrimination will be more likely to attend ingroup activities than those who did not perceive any discrimination.

H4: Individuals who perceived societal discrimination are more likely to engage in ingroup activities than individuals who had not perceived such discrimination.

Case Selection: Muslim-Americans in the Post 9/11 Era

The widespread discrimination that Muslim-Americans face in the contemporary political and social environment makes this population well suited for this study. Historically, Muslims in the United States and the West have been portrayed very negatively in the media and political discourse and are often associated with violence, oppression, and radicalism (Esposito, 1999; Said, 1997; Shaheen, 2001). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, stereotypical views of Muslims only strengthened, worsening Americans' perceptions of Muslims (Cainkar, 2002; Howell & Shryock, 2003). Today, Americans rate Muslims more negatively than nearly all other religious or racial groups (Edgell et al., 2006; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). As a result, Muslims are facing a rising tide of discrimination in communities across the United States. According to the 2002 FBI Uniform Crime Report, shortly after 9/11 hate crimes against Muslim-Americans increased by 1,600% (Serrano, 2002). A decade later, the rate of hate crimes against Muslims has not returned to the pre-9/11 numbers. In fact, between 2009 and 2010, a year in which Muslims and mosques across the country came under substantial social and political scrutiny (see Wajahat et al., 2011), the FBI reported a 50% increase in hate crimes against Muslims.[11] In March 2011, the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights, Thomas Perez, testified in front of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution, Civic Rights, and Human Rights, that in each city and town where he has met with Muslims, he has been "...struck by the fear that pervades their [Muslims] lives" (Morgan, 2011). According to Perez, Muslim youth often fall victim to schoolyard bullying and harassment, and their parents increasingly find themselves targets of discrimination in the workplace.[12]

Discrimination toward Muslim-Americans is certainly not just prevalent in neighborhoods, places of business, at work, or in schools across the country. Concerns over the war on terrorism have resulted in the enactment and implementation of several controversial national security policies. Nearly a month after 9/11, the 107th Congress passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001. This act granted government officials expansive investigative authority such as the ability to conduct secret searches and to detain or deport individuals judged to be a "threat" to the United States. Shortly after the USA Patriot Act, Congress also established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) aimed at increasing the monitoring of airplane passengers. Since the establishment of the TSA, frequent

---

[9] With time, victims of societal discrimination who partake in ingroup activities could overcome negative feelings and start embracing the idea of getting involved in mainstream political events. Panel data is required to appropriately test this relationship.

[10] This study does not measure the impact of discrimination on group identification due to a lack of precise questions in both the 2007 Pew and 2007–2008 MAPOS datasets.

[11] In recent years, 53 proposed mosques and Islamic centers have encountered community resistance. For more information on efforts to interfere with the construction of mosques and Islamic centers in the United States, visit: http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/2012Mosque-Map.pdf

[12] The statement of Thomas E. Perez is available online at: http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-1/03-29-11-crt-perez-testimony-re-protecting-the-civil-rights-of-muslim-americans.pdf

incidences of racially targeted searches and questioning in airports have popularized the phrase "flying while Muslim" among journalists and civil rights advocates.

In addition to the wrongful detention, deportation, and racial profiling of Muslim-Americans in the United States, the Associated Press recently found evidence of a spying campaign aimed at Muslim individuals and institutions conducted by the New York Police Department (NYPD). Four Associated Press investigative reporters found that the NYPD secretly built one of the largest domestic intelligence agencies in the country intended to catalog where Muslims work, shop, and pray (Greenwald, 2012). In particular, the reporters documented how "Plainclothes officers from the NYPD's Demographics Unit fanned out across Newark, taking pictures and eavesdropping on conversations inside businesses owned or frequented by Muslims. . ." (Greenwald, 2012) to compile a guide to Newark's Muslims. The NYPD also created a list of devout Muslims to watch, treated name changes as worthy of investigation, and placed informants inside mosques. Despite extensive surveillance of hundreds of Muslims and the infiltration of dozens of mosques and student groups, the NYPD dossier cited no evidence of terrorism or criminal behavior.

In response to the surveillance program and consistent with the argument that political discrimination ignites participation, an estimated five hundred Muslim-Americans gathered for Friday prayer service in lower Manhattan Park and marched to New York Police headquarters chanting, "Surveillance is violence, we won't remain silent!" During the protest, Imam Talib Abdur-Rashid, addressing the crowed, stated that "We are unapologetically Muslim and uncompromisingly American," and asked Mayor Michel Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly to respect Muslims. In addition to the demonstration, a coalition of Muslim organizations and their supporters sent a letter to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and the state Attorney General asking for a speedy investigation into the extent of NYPD spying activities. And more recently, a group of New Jersey residents, mosques, and organizations filed a federal lawsuit against the City of New York, accusing the NYPD of violating their constitutional rights by targeting them on the basis of religion.

In short, no racial, ethnic, or religious group has been subjected to societal and political discrimination to the degree that Muslim-Americans have been exposed to *since the 9/11 terrorist attacks*. In the last decade, this population has experienced unprecedented surges in hate crimes, workplace discrimination, and the infringement of civil liberties. These experiences provide an ideal platform to begin examining the direct relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior in much more detail than previous studies have been able to investigate.[13]

Data

Two national surveys, the 2007–2008 Muslim American Public Opinion survey (MAPOS) and the 2007 Pew Research Center Study of American Muslims, have been selected to assess the impact of political and social discrimination on sociopolitical behavior. MAPOS was fielded outside 22 randomly selected mosques and Islamic centers in the East, West, and Midwest, as well as the major Muslim population centers in the United States.[14] Participants were selected using a traditional skip pattern to randomize recruitment. The survey was administered in an exit-poll format whereby trained research assistants handed paper questionnaires to selected individuals who then completed the survey

---

[13] Nevertheless, since discrimination is usually not one of the primary interests of survey researchers and because discrimination is a very complex concept, data limitations persist. For example, many surveys about politics do not contain any questions regarding experiences with or perceptions of societal discrimination.

[14] Cities in which surveys were conducted were Dearborn, MI; Seattle, WA; San Diego, CA; Irvine, CA; Riverside, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Raleigh-Durham, NC; Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; Houston, TX; Washington D.C.; and Oklahoma City, OK. A large number of the surveys were gathered outside the prayers services during Eid al Adha and Eid al Fitr, which are events similar to religious services for Christmas and Easter Mass. This makes sure that both devout and secular Muslims are included in the sample. A response rate was not recorded because research assistants were unable to keep track of individuals who refused to participate in the study.

Table 1. Comparison of Pew and MAPOS Surveys

	MAPOS (07-08)	Pew (2007)
Arab	44%	25%
Asian	24%	18%
Black	16%	24%
Sunni	65%	50%
Shi'a	11%	16%
U.S. Born	45%	35%
Foreign Born	55%	65%
Citizen	73%	75%
Voted	64%	59%
N	1,410	1,050

on their own. In total, 1,410 self-administered surveys were completed in English, Arabic, or Farsi.[15] The 2007 Pew Survey of Muslims was conducted by telephone between January 24 and April 20, 2007 using a nationally representative random sample. The 1,050 self-identified adult Muslims who completed the survey were given the opportunity to answer questions in English, Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi.[16] Both surveys cover a wide range of topics related to religious, social, and political issues and are quite representative of the overall American Muslim population, containing a large number of Arab, African-American, Asian, and foreign-born respondents. Table 1 provides a comparison of some key demographic characteristics of the two surveys.[17]

The rationale for using Pew and MAPOS is to adequately test the study's hypotheses and to assess the generalizability of the findings across two datasets. Since secondary data is being used to investigate an understudied topic, each survey has key limitations. While the Pew survey contains several precise questions to construct suitable political and societal discrimination variables, it only asks respondents whether they are registered voters and whether they have voted in the 2004 presidential election. The absence of nontraditional political participation measures effectively eliminates noncitizen Muslims (23% of the sample) from the analysis. MAPOS compensates for this limitation by asking respondents not only if they have voted, but also if they have participated in a protest/rally, wrote a letter to a public official, or attended a community meeting between the years of 2006 to 2008. However, the drawback with MAPOS is that it does not ask any precise questions regarding experiences with societal discrimination.

Variable Specification and Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variables

The MAPOS dataset was first used to evaluate the effect of political discrimination on four types of political activities: self-reported voting, participation in a protest/rally, attendance in a community meeting, and contact with a government representative (coding and distributions of all the variables are presented in Tables 6 and 7 in the online supporting information. Among the entire sample, which includes citizen and noncitizen respondents, 27% attended a protest/rally, 47% participated in a

---

[15] For more detailed information about MAPOS, visit www.muslimamericansurvey.org/survey.htm

[16] The average margin of sampling error of the completed surveys is $+/-$ 5 percentage points (95% CI). A response rate of 27% was achieved for list sample, 58% for the recontact sample, and 29% for RDD sample. For more detailed info about the survey, visit: http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf

[17] The discrepancy in the percentage of Arabs between Pew and MAPOS is largely due to the way Pew recruited participants and asked about the race of respondents. While the MAPOS survey had an "Arab" option under the race category, the Pew study did not. As a result, a good portion of third-generation Arab respondents may have self-identified as "other" or "White."

community activity, and 33% wrote a letter to a public official. As for electoral participation, 61% of all citizens indicated that they had voted in the 2006 or 2008 November elections.[18]

The Pew Survey was then utilized to estimate the effect of political and societal discrimination on self-reported voter registration status, turnout, and participation in mosque activities beyond prayer (ingroup involvement measure). Respondents were asked whether they are registered to vote in their precinct or election district and whether they have voted in the 2004 presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry. Among the citizens, who composed 58% of the sample, 69% registered to vote and 59% voted—71% chose Kerry and 14% voted for Bush. The ingroup involvement variable was constructed by assigning a 1 to respondents who indicated that they took part in religious and social activities at the mosque or Islamic center outside of Salah and Jum'ah prayer (32%) and a 0 to those who did not engage in mosque activities beyond prayer (68%). In the United States, mosque activities outside of prayer service can range from Islamic study and Arabic classes to programs for women and youth, fitness/sports classes, and parenting and marriage courses. This means that the mosque provides more services than just religiously oriented activities.

Key Independent Variables

The key independent variables are political and societal discrimination. In the MAPOS models, political discrimination was measured using the following question: "Do you think the new security measures at U.S. airports are targeted at Muslims or at all Americans equally?" Approximately 75% of the respondents perceived the security measures to be implemented in a biased manner. As indicated earlier, a reliable measure of societal discrimination does not exist in the MAPOS dataset. The only remotely related question invites respondents to conflate perceptions of systematic (political) discrimination with interpersonal (societal) discrimination. Respondents were asked to what extent they think discrimination against *immigrants* is a problem in today's society. This question is not only vague, it also does not ask individuals to consider whether discrimination is a problem for *Muslims* in specific.

The Pew dataset, however, has several detailed questions that were combined to compose a societal discrimination variable ranging from 0 to 3 ($\alpha = 0.55$). Specifically, respondents were asked the following questions: "Have people acted as if they are suspicious of you because you are Muslim?"; "Have you been called offensive names because you are a Muslim?"; and "Have you been physically threatened or attacked because you are a Muslim?" The distribution of this variable is heavily skewed to the left tail with 71% of respondents not reporting any form of societal discrimination. About one-fifth (19%) of the sample reported one type of social discrimination, 8% two types, and 2% three types of discrimination. As for political discrimination, individuals were asked if they have been singled out by airport security because they are Muslim.[19] Close to one-out-of-five respondents answered in the affirmative to this question.

Control Variables

An examination of discrimination and sociopolitical behavior must account for a variety of alternative explanations. The first set of variables for which this research controls for are sociodemographic indicators. These include age, education, income, race, gender, and nativity (U.S. vs. foreign-born). Previous work has demonstrated that older, more educated, and wealthier individuals are not only better positioned to comprehend and access information about political issues, but they are also situated in social environments that further enhance communication and organization capabilities (civic skills) crucial to democratic engagement (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972;

---

[18] Each of the participation measures ranges from 0 (inactivity) to 1 (activity).
[19] Only respondents who have traveled were included.

Verba et al., 1978; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Gender could also play an important role when assessing the political engagement of Muslims.[20] Wearing the headscarf, or hijab, could expose women to greater scrutiny, and Muslim women may be less involved in politics than men due largely to conservative notions of women's proper role within the household and the community (Jalalzai, 2009). However, recent empirical studies have not found any significant differences between the political participation of Muslim men and women in the United States (Ayers & Hofstetter, 2008; Dana, Barreto, & Oskooii, 2011; Jamal, 2005). Nativity is also accounted for because first-generation immigrants are likely to have less exposure to democratic practices (especially those from restrictive societies), be less acclimated to the American political system, and feel less entitled to confront acts of discrimination than their U.S.-born counterpart.[21]

In addition to standard demographic controls, measures of political interest and partisanship were also incorporated. In the Pew sample, political interest was measured by asking respondents whether they subscribe to a weekly newspaper. Participants in the MAPOS survey were asked how closely they followed news about candidates and initiatives in the 2006 or 2008 elections. Party attachment was measured by creating a dummy variable (no partisanship = 1) that separates individuals who do not identify with a party from those who identify with or lean towards the Democratic or Republican Party—in both datasets about 25% were nonaffiliates. Both of these measures serve as important controls. Those with higher levels of political interest and attentiveness tend to be more active in sociopolitical affairs (Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) and also are more likely to be aware of policies that target Muslims negatively. Party identification is strongly linked to political engagement because individuals who identify with a political party are more likely to vote, attend campaign meetings, and organize voter registration drives than those with weak or nonexistent party attachment (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1978).[22]

Lastly, mosque involvement was included in all of the political participation models since such activity could enhance political engagement and awareness to discrimination. Previous research demonstrates that religious institutions—especially historically Black churches—are considered catalysts to political participation because they play an important role in developing civic skills, political knowledge and attentiveness, and commitments to a cause by providing a regular meeting place in which individuals can interact and discuss public events and affairs (Dawson, 1994; McDaniel, 2008; Tate, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Places of worship also directly engage members into the political process by providing cues about salient issues (for example, discrimination toward one's group), endorsing local or national candidates, and asking those affiliated to take political action (Harris, 1994; McDaniel, 2008). Recent work on Muslims demonstrates that mosques, just like churches and synagogues, are conduits of political participation (Dana et al., 2011; Jamal, 2005).

Mosque attendance was measured by asking respondents how frequently they attended the mosque. Levels of attendance are fairly similar across the two datasets despite differences in question

---

[20] For more general literature on gender and politics, refer to Burns, Scholzman, and Verba (1997, 2001).

[21] Other important indicators of political engagement are length of time in the United States and language proficiency. Unfortunately, both datasets did not have a measure of length of time lived in the United States among foreign-born participants. With that said, MAPOS did have a question about language spoken at home (a crude indicator of English proficiency), but Pew did not. It should be noted that controlling for language spoken at home and other variables such as linked fate (whether the respondent thinks what happens to Muslims in the United States will affect what happens to them) in the MAPOS models did not impact the study's findings. In the Pew dataset, questions about linked fate or language spoken at home were not available. However, Pew did ask a question about identity—whether individuals consider themselves first as Muslim or American (options for "both equally" or "neither/other" were available). Controlling for identity did not have a measurable impact on the relationship between discrimination and electoral participation. Perhaps not surprisingly, those who identified as American first had a higher likelihood of voting than those who identified as Muslim first.

[22] Other important psychological controls that were not available in both datasets include political trust, knowledge, and efficacy.

wording.[23] About 16% of Muslims in the Pew sample stated that they frequently attend worship (more than once a week) with 18% indicating no involvement. As for Muslims in the MAPOS dataset, 12% reported no involvement at all, and 26% indicated being very involved in their mosque.

For the ingroup participation model, two additional controls—religiosity index and importance of religion in life—were introduced to isolate the effect of discrimination and religiosity when estimating the likelihood of attending mosque activities beyond prayer. The religiosity index ($\alpha = 0.77$) was composed by adding responses to the following questions: "How often do you pray?"; "How important is fasting during Ramadan?"; "Do you believe the Koran is the word of God?"; and "Do you believe the Koran is to be taken literally, word for word?" The index ranges from 2 to 14 with a mean of 10.85 and a standard deviation of 3.13. As for the importance of religion in one's life, about 54% indicated that religion is "very important" in their life, 29% stated "somewhat important," and 16% thought that religion is "not too important" or "not at all important."

Findings

A total of seven two-tailed logistic regression models were estimated to rigorously investigate the relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior.[24] Models 1–6 (see Tables 2 and 3) test Hypotheses 1 and 2 of the article. The last model assesses the impact of social and political discrimination on ingroup involvement (see Table 4). In addition to reporting regression coefficients and fit statistics, predicted probabilities are provided to graphically demonstrate the relative strength of each independent variable on the dependent variables (see Figures 2–4). Using a standard simulation technique known as first difference, predicted probabilities were calculated by changing the independent variables under analysis from minimum to maximum value while holding all the other covariates at their central tendency (mean).

Models 1-4 measure the impact of political discrimination on political participation among MAPOS participants. Based on the theoretical framework detailed earlier, political discrimination is likely to increase one's propensity to engage in politics. The results show strong support for this claim, confirming hypothesis one. The perception that airport security measures are being implemented discriminatorily against Muslims has a statistically and substantively significant impact on all four participation measures even after accounting for various confounders. Specifically, political discrimination increased the probability of voting by 14%, protesting by 12%, attending a community meeting by 15%, and writing to a public official by 6% (see Figure 2).[25]

As expected, various sociodemographic and attitudinal variables also structure the political participation of American Muslims. In the MAPOS voting model, nativity, education, income, age, political interest, and party attachment had sizable effects on voting behavior. Respondents who were born in the United States, are more educated and have higher incomes, older, more interested in politics, and

---

[23] Pew interviewees were asked to report mosque attendance (0 = no attendance, 5 = weekly attendance) while MAPOS respondents were asked to indicate involvement in mosque activities (0 = no involvement at all, 4 = very involved).

[24] All the bivariate results are presented in Tables 1 through 5 in the online supporting information and have been weighted using the original survey weights. The simple two-way analyses demonstrate stark differences in between political and societal discrimination and measures of sociopolitical behavior.

[25] Since perceptions rather than actual experiences of airport discrimination is being measured with the MAPOS dataset, one concern is that those who are interested in politics not only participate more but are also aware of discriminatory policies toward their group. To deal with this issue, beyond just controlling for political interest, additional models were estimated separating individuals who indicated that they were very or somewhat attentive to news about candidates and initiatives from those who indicated "not much" or "not at all interested." If political discrimination is not statistically associated with political participation among those who are *not* too interested in politics, then it is really political interest that is driving both awareness of discrimination and political activism. The additional models (available upon request) do not show such a pattern. Political discrimination in both subsamples (in political attentive and inattentive models) is positively correlated with voting, protesting, attending a meeting, and writing to a public official.

Table 2. The Impact of Discrimination on Political Participation Measures

	Model 1 Vote (MAPOS)	Model 2 Protest (MAPOS)	Model 3 Meeting (MAPOS)	Model 4 Write (MAPOS)
Political Discrimination	0.594**	0.691***	0.592***	0.382*
	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.153)	(0.177)
Political Interest	0.396***	0.157†	0.297***	0.295**
	(0.095)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.091)
Mosque Attendance	0.079	0.489***	0.510***	0.213**
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.073)
Female	−0.061	0.364*	−0.297*	−0.017
	(0.157)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.147)
Age	0.501***	0.024	0.213*	0.008
	(0.111)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.096)
High Education	1.103***	−0.174	0.242	0.845**
	(0.266)	(0.235)	(0.213)	(0.260)
Mid Education	0.716***	−0.151	−0.021	0.602**
	(0.208)	(0.195)	(0.180)	(0.230)
Missing Education	−1.479†	−0.145	0.018	0.535
	(0.830)	(0.598)	(0.534)	(0.638)
High Income	0.431†	0.361†	0.144	0.282
	(0.234)	(0.216)	(0.193)	(0.216)
Mid Income	0.498**	0.330*	0.386*	0.261
	(0.187)	(0.172)	(0.152)	(0.174)
Missing Income	0.049	−0.151	0.055	−0.448
	(0.351)	(0.317)	(0.271)	(0.346)
U.S. Born	0.563**	0.961***	0.608***	0.538***
	(0.171)	(0.150)	(0.139)	(0.152)
No Party Attachment	−1.164***	−0.445**	−0.451**	−1.135***
	(0.189)	(0.170)	(0.147)	(0.198)
Black	−0.521*	−1.089***	−0.310†	−0.668**
	(0.232)	(0.211)	(0.188)	(0.215)
Asian	−0.649***	−0.778***	−0.438**	−0.344*
	(0.192)	(0.171)	(0.152)	(0.170)
Other Race	−0.809**	−0.838***	−0.455*	−0.014
	(0.247)	(0.220)	(0.197)	(0.211)
(Intercept)	−2.983***	−3.430***	−3.277***	—3.441***
	(0.491)	(0.445)	(0.394)	(0.461)
N	920	1256	1256	1256
McFadden's R^2	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.09
ML (Cox-Snell) R^2	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.10
log L	−464.787	−611.875	−726.677	−602.939

Note. Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses.
†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

identify with either the Democratic or Republic Party were about 13%, 23%, 10%, 31%, 28%, and 27% more likely to cast a ballot, respectively.

Having established the association between political discrimination and political behavior using the MAPOS dataset, models 5 and 6 were estimated to investigate the impact of both political and societal discrimination on registration status and turnout using the Pew dataset. In line with the MAPOS outcomes, political discrimination increased the likelihood of registration by 7% and voting by 13% (see Figure 3). In sharp contrast, societal discrimination stifled the willingness to register to vote and to turnout, confirming Hypothesis 2. Pew participants who perceived three acts of societal discrimination were 17% less like to register and 20% less likely to vote in the 2004 presidential

Table 3. The Impact of Discrimination on Registration and Turnout

	Model 5 *Registration* (PEW)	Model 6 *Turnout* (PEW)
Political Discrimination	0.460†	0.656**
	(0.249)	(0.230)
Societal Discrimination	−0.295*	−0.283*
	(0.131)	(0.128)
Political Interest	0.262	0.934***
	(0.226)	(0.217)
Mosque Attendance	0.037	0.055
	(0.057)	(0.053)
Female	0.068	−0.111
	(0.188)	(0.176)
Age	0.032***	0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
High Education	1.015**	0.860**
	(0.323)	(0.285)
Mid Education	0.471*	0.405†
	(0.210)	(0.207)
Missing Education	−0.296	−1.423
	(1.274)	(1.385)
High Income	0.226	0.511†
	(0.312)	(0.279)
Mid Income	0.221	0.304
	(0.231)	(0.211)
Missing Income	−0.649*	−0.410
	(0.269)	(0.292)
U.S. Born	0.448†	1.170***
	(0.245)	(0.249)
No Party Attachment	−0.757***	−0.997***
	(0.226)	(0.222)
Black	0.520†	−0.001
	(0.303)	(0.301)
Asian	0.826**	0.292
	(0.265)	(0.238)
Other Race	0.276	0.369
	(0.247)	(0.243)
(Intercept)	−1.078*	−1.652***
	(0.430)	(0.431)
N	776	742
McFadden's R^2	0.11	0.15
ML (Cox-Snell) R^2	0.12	0.17
log *L*	−321.985	−361.350

Note. Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses.
†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

election that those who did not perceive any discrimination. This relationship provides strong support for the claim that differentiating between political and societal discrimination is important. While the perception of political discrimination serves as a mobilizing force, the opposite could be concluded for individuals exposed to interpersonal discrimination.[26]

---

[26] The combined effect of political and societal discrimination on turnout was also tested using the Pew dataset (regression results are available upon request). The interaction term was not associated with the propensity to vote, and it did not alter the main results. That is, individuals who reported experiencing societal discrimination but not any political discrimination were less likely to vote, and those who experienced political discrimination but not societal discrimination were more likely to vote.

Table 4. Discrimination and Attending Mosque Activities beyond Prayer

	Model 7 (PEW)
Political Discrimination	0.551**
	(0.192)
Societal Discrimination	0.383***
	(0.113)
Religiosity	0.224***
	(0.041)
Importance of Religion	0.607**
	(0.185)
Political Interest	0.256
	(0.182)
Female	0.035
	(0.162)
Age	−0.002
	(0.006)
High Education	1.019***
	(0.261)
Mid Education	0.679***
	(0.203)
Missing Education	0.656
	(1.350)
High Income	0.964***
	(0.255)
Mid Income	0.624**
	(0.203)
Missing Income	0.196
	(0.260)
U.S. Born	1.046***
	(0.210)
No Party Attachment	−0.084
	(0.200)
Black	0.370
	(0.257)
Asian	0.198
	(0.221)
Other Race	0.132
	(0.239)
(Intercept)	−7.328***
	(0.759)
N	973
McFadden's R^2	0.20
ML (Cox-Snell) R^2	0.22
log L	−434.728

Note. Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses.
[†]$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

    Consistent with the results obtained from the MAPOS voting model, political interest, age, education, income, nativity, and party attachment were all significantly associated with electoral participation. However, unlike self-identified Arabs in the MAPOS sample, Arabs in the Pew model were no more likely than Blacks, Asians, and other racial groups to vote. This difference is most likely a function of limited response options in the Pew survey. Since an "Arab" category did not exist, third-generation Arab-Americans could have selected the "other" or "White" option, making the ethnic-specific finding unreliable.

Figure 2. The change in the predicted probability of political participation. Symbols in Figure 2 indicate the change in the predicted probability of voting, protesting, attending a meeting, and writing to a public official. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically significant.

To test the Hypotheses 3 and 4, participation in mosque/Islamic-center-related activities beyond Salah and Jumíah prayer was regressed on political and societal discrimination. Based on social identity theory, the expectation is that perceptions of societal or political prejudice increase the desire to identify with one's ingroup. The results obtained from Model 7 provide strong support for this theory (see Table 4). Political discrimination is positively and significantly related to participation in mosque activities beyond prayer. Individuals who experienced political discrimination were 11% more likely to attend mosque activities beyond prayer than those who did not experience any discrimination (see Figure 4). Societal discrimination is also a statistically significant predictor of mosque activity, increasing the likelihood of attendance by 28%. The positive effects were observed even after accounting for religiosity and importance of religion in one's life, which are two key covariates of mosque attendance beyond prayer. This suggests that Muslims attend the mosque for other purposes besides religious motives.

Further Evaluation of the Theory

The theoretical argument advanced in this study is that interpersonal or everyday societal discrimination can lead to feelings of powerlessness, inferiority, hopelessness, or sadness and, in turn, contribute to political acquiescence. After all, participation does require tremendous material and psychological capital. But how do we know that individuals who reported experiencing societal

Figure 3. The change in the predicted probability of registration and turnout. Symbols in indicate the change in the predicted probability of attending voter registration status and turnout. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically significant.

discrimination within the Pew sample are somehow psychologically worse off than their counterpart or those who only experienced political discrimination? While it may be true that a plethora of epidemiological studies have established the relationship between societal discrimination and adverse mental health outcomes, no such evidence has been presented in the context of this study. To account for this, the relationship between discrimination, political discontent, and self-reported unhappiness will be explored to provide further evidence in support of the theoretical framework.

In total, six logistic regression models were estimated to evaluate the relationship between discrimination and three key survey questions contained in the Pew dataset. The first four models displayed in Table 5 assess the relationship between discrimination and disapproval toward President Bush and dissatisfaction with the general state of the country. The expectation is that those who experienced political or societal discrimination will be more likely than individuals who did not experience any discrimination to repudiate government actors and institutions that pose a threat to their interests or contributed toward their marginalization. For Muslims, the introduction of the USA Patriot Act by Congress and its subsequent approval by President Bush is one source of motivation for increased political involvement. As Dahl has argued in *Who Governs?*, people engage in politics not necessarily from a sense of duty or sustained interest in politics. Rather, they become politically active "...when primary goals at the focus of their lives are endangered" (1961, p. 224). When faced with undesirable

Figure 4. Predictors of attending mosque activities beyond prayer. Symbols indicate the change in the predicted probability of attending mosque activities beyond prayer. The lines attached to the symbols represent 95% confidence bands. If any part of the confidence bands crosses zero, that variable is not statistically significant.

political conditions such as secret searches and seizures or racial profiling in airports, mobilization is likely to ensue. However, as previously argued, for citizens to spend their limited resources on the political process, they must feel that their actions can make some sort of difference. Cynicism could keep people at home during elections or discourage them from sharing their concerns with their representatives. It is precisely at this juncture where we should see a point of departure from individuals who experienced societal discrimination as opposed to political. While unwelcomed policies or institutional violations of equality and fairness could make one angry and ignite activism, experiences with interpersonal rejection could moderate participatory inclinations as such experiences are likely to decrease one's sense of confidence or make one feel pessimistic that meaningful change is achievable. This outlook is one plausible explanation for why societal discrimination is negatively associated with participation but political discrimination is positively linked to engagement.

To determine if there is any psychological difference between individuals who experienced societal as opposed to political discrimination or no prejudice at all, the following question will be used: "Generally, how would you say things are these days in your life—would you say that you are very

Table 5. The Effect of Discrimination on Disapproval, Dissatisfaction, and Unhappiness

	Model 8 BushDisap.	Model 8.1 BushDisap.	Model 9 Dissatisfied	Model 9.1 Dissatisfied	Model 10 Unhappy	Model 10.1 Unhappy
Pol. Disc.	0.717**	0.744*	0.463**	0.504**	−0.300	−0.031
	(0.265)	(0.290)	(0.173)	(0.191)	(0.214)	(0.235)
Soc. Disc.	0.571**	0.531**	0.564***	0.430***	0.417***	0.496***
	(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.111)	(0.126)
Pol. Interest		−0.099		0.007		−0.152
		(0.230)		(0.174)		(0.228)
Mosque Att.		0.167**		0.074		−0.077
		(0.062)		(0.046)		(0.055)
Female		0.353†		0.220		−0.244
		(0.204)		(0.151)		(0.187)
Age		0.016*		0.011†		0.011
		(0.008)		(0.006)		(0.007)
High Educ		0.162		0.220		−0.733*
		(0.324)		(0.234)		(0.301)
Mid Educ		−0.123		0.324†		−0.560**
		(0.241)		(0.182)		(0.206)
Mis Educ		−0.680		−1.154		−0.541
		(1.324)		(1.200)		(1.215)
High Inc		0.360		0.379		−0.920**
		(0.320)		(0.242)		(0.308)
Mid Inc		0.630*		−0.064		−1.012***
		(0.258)		(0.187)		(0.241)
Mis Inc		−0.539†		−0.570*		−0.579*
		(0.287)		(0.234)		(0.270)
U.S. Born		0.844**		1.034***		−0.868***
		(0.303)		(0.214)		(0.262)
No Party		−0.279		−0.421*		0.190
		(0.236)		(0.182)		(0.219)
Black		0.008		0.485†		0.203
		(0.356)		(0.253)		(0.302)
Asian		−0.496†		−0.077		−0.288
		(0.265)		(0.198)		(0.262)
Other Race		0.038		0.207		0.367
		(0.280)		(0.204)		(0.243)
(Intercept)	1.283***	−0.019	0.101	−1.021**	−1.703***	−0.854*
	(0.103)	(0.468)	(0.079)	(0.355)	(0.105)	(0.409)
N	898	873	969	936	1008	972
McFad. R^2	0.03	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.10
ML R^2	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.02	0.09
log L	−383.744	−297.118	−620.960	−504.677	−444.821	−352.924

Note. Logistic Regression (two-tailed test); Standard errors in parentheses.

$^†p < .10$; $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?"[27] While this is not the most ideal measure, it does help us to evaluate if societal discrimination is in fact associated with an indicator of mental well-being.[28] If the

[27] Ideally, one would want to measure the impact of prejudice on a host of sociopsychological indicators of mental well-being. However, besides this survey question, no other indicators of psychological health were available.

[28] Respondents who indicated that they were "very happy" or "pretty happy" were combined and assigned to value 0 and those who stated that they were "not too happy" were assigned value 1. Alternatively, ordered probit regression was estimated without combining the "very happy" and "pretty happy" response options. The results from the logistic and ordered probit models did not substantively differ.

theoretical position offered thus far is sound, we should expect to see a positive association between societal discrimination and feelings of unhappiness. On average, victims of this type of discrimination should be more likely than their counterparts to indicate that they are not too happy with things in their life partly due to their negative interpersonal encounters.

The results (see Table 5) offer strong support for the theoretical framework. There is a clear association between both types of discrimination and disapproval toward Bush and general discontent. When asked whether participants approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president, those who reported being singled out by airport security were 9% more likely to disapprove of Bush. Similarly, citizens who experienced three acts of social discrimination were 6% more likely to disapprove of Bush as compared to those who did not experience any prejudice. This result is robust even when various sociodemographic and political controls are introduced (see model 8.1). Likewise, when asked whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country today, Muslims who reported political discrimination were 13% more likely to show displeasure, and those subjected to interpersonal hostility were 10% more likely to state that they are dissatisfied. In contrast, political discrimination had no bearing on feelings of sadness. However, discrimination in the form of insults, threats, or harassments in social domains is correlated with self-reported unhappiness. Victims of societal discrimination were about 6% more likely than those who did not experience any discrimination to state that they are "not too happy." This difference, along with the study's main findings, further illuminates that drawing a distinction between political and societal discrimination is useful and necessary. However, it is important to underscore the limitations of observational data in assessing the relationship between discrimination, sociopolitical behavior, and mental well-being. Even when utilizing complex statistical models, omitted variable bias issues can undermine the researcher's ability to make credible causal inferences. Not all the possible confounding factors or even the theoretically relevant ones can be identified or successfully measured, especially when relying on secondary data. Additionally, model-based approaches are oftentimes confronted with issues of endogeneity, making it difficult to evaluate the reliability of the results, specifically the causal direction. As such, the next line of research on this topic needs to further explore these dynamics with a randomized controlled experiment. A well-designed randomized experiment can ensure that potential confounders are balanced across the treatment and control group, giving researches more confidence that the treatment—in this case societal or political discrimination—is independent of other factors that could impact the outcome. An experiment can also better identify the specific channels through which the relationship between discrimination and sociopolitical behavior operates.

Conclusion and Discussion

The prevailing wisdom within the discipline of political science is that the awareness of discrimination motivates individuals from various ethnic and racial backgrounds to take action rather than to resign from politics. The present study challenges this perspective and suggests that heightened or depressed political activism is partly contingent on whether an individual has experienced political or societal discrimination. Although previous work and the empirical results obtained in this research demonstrate that systematic discrimination may encourage people to engage in a wide variety of traditional and nontraditional sociopolitical activities, the same cannot necessarily be concluded for individuals who have fallen victim to societal intolerance. On the contrary, the results suggest (see summary Table 6) that Muslim-Americans exposed to peer discrimination may be less inclined to register to vote or to cast a ballot than those devoid of such experiences. This outcome should perhaps not be surprising as a plethora of epidemiological studies have found a strong link between perceptions of unfair treatment in social domains and destructive psychological outcomes such as symptoms of depression, worthlessness, and hopelessness among various racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Table 6. Summary of Regression Results

	Political Discrimination	Societal Discrimination
Registration (Pew)	+7%	−17%
Vote (Pew)	+13%	−20%
Vote (MAPOS)	+14%	na
Protest (MAPOS)	+12%	na
Meeting (MAPOS)	+15%	na
Contact (MAPOS)	+6%	na
Ingroup Activity (Pew)	+11%	+28%
Disapprove Bush (Pew)	+9%	+6%
Dissatisfied (Pew)	+13%	+10%
Unhappy in Life (Pew)	n.s.	+6%

Note. Changes in predicted probability (min-max), keeping all covariates at their respective means.

On a more encouraging note, although victims of societal discrimination may not be motivated to turnout possibly due to a reduced confidence in their ability to bring about meaningful sociopolitical changes, it is promising to find that such individuals are not completely withdrawn or isolated. Consistent with social identity theory, the findings demonstrate that devalued Muslim-Americans, those who have been denied acceptance and fair treatment by members of society, were more likely than their counterparts to get involved in civic activities with their lower-status ingroup members. One reason for why discrimination increases ingroup involvement has to do with people's desire to feel that they belong (Branscombe et al., 1999). For Muslims who sense that gaining acceptance in everyday interactions is improbable due to their negative experiences, the most adaptive response might be to increase one's investment in one's own group. This is a promising step as increased identification with one's ingroup can aid victims to overcome psychological barriers to political participation. However, panel studies are needed to sufficiently investigate how ingroup involvement can translate into participation in mainstream politics for victims of societal rejection.

Existing work in political science has largely overlooked the negative psychological consequences of discrimination and its relation to politics, lagging behind epidemiological studies in developing clear theories and measurements of discrimination. This is because discrimination is rarely the *primary* focus of the factors related to the sociopolitical behavior and attitudes of minority groups. When discrimination is paid attention to, clear distinctions between different types of discrimination are rarely drawn. There appears to be an underlying assumption that all forms of discrimination impact behavior similarly. Some may also reasonably wonder whether individuals can actually distinguish between different types of discrimination rather than merging all of their negative experiences together and seeing them as general racism in America. This article contends that such differentiation is quite conceivable. Consider the following example: an Arab Muslim-American has lived in a liberal, diverse, and relatively welcoming neighborhood for his whole life. He has not personally experienced any hostility in his everyday social encounters and neither have his family members. He is generally treated with respect and is accepted by the people in his greater community. However, when traveling, he notices that he gets repeatedly singled out by airport security for extra screening, which he presumes is due to his ethnic background. This person, while offended by the extra screening and upset at such discriminatory government practices, is unlikely to extrapolate such events to broader social dynamics and thinks that American society, for the most part, is prejudiced toward Arabs or Muslims. His positive everyday encounters with citizens simply do not confirm this belief. This person will mostly likely attribute the racial profiling to more systematic or institutional dynamics, such as George Bush's post-9/11 security policies. Because he is not surrounded by discrimination in his personal life, he is more likely than someone who has faced pervasive stigmatization in his community to believe that policy change in the form of political participation is achievable. When such

examples are considered in light of empirical results that demonstrate differential behavioral outcomes based on the source of discrimination, the assertion that individuals can and do distinguish between different types of discrimination becomes plausible. This claim is further supported by the observation that broad discrimination has no impact on behavior. By combining the two categories of discrimination (political and societal)—creating an overarching discrimination variable—no relationship between broad discrimination and political participation was found.[29] Despite these findings, it must, however, be acknowledged that this question can be better addressed with more creative and detailed survey questions and other methods. Qualitative and experimental research can especially shed light on whether and how individuals distinguish between different types of discrimination.

Another pressing shortcoming in the discipline is that existing instruments do not contain clear and precise questions about other types of discrimination. Discrimination is not only an afterthought in the most comprehensive studies related to the civic and political engagement of minorities but also in the design of surveys. This issue has also limited the present study. Due to a lack of detailed questions, it was not possible to analyze how other forms of mistreatment that can also be propagated by one's group members, such as discrimination based on accent, impact sociopolitical behavior. Without precise and varied questions, it becomes extremely challenging to uncover other factors associated with democratic engagement and detachment among minority populations. Future work should try to differentiate more specifically between different types of awareness (indirect vs. direct exposure), severity and frequency levels, and timing in one's life (childhood, adolescence, and adulthood) among other factors.

In addition to what has been highlighted thus far, the next line of research should examine the applicability of this theory for other minority groups. Some may wonder whether the outlined theory is limited to the Muslim-American experience. After all, Muslim-Americans are a relatively small, new outgroup on the block with less group-based resources than other established minority groups. Other groups with a much longer history of confronting inequality and more established ingroup, neighborhood-level institutional resources may not be as adversely impacted or may respond differently to discrimination. There is, however, reason to believe that the outlined theory is pertinent to other underrepresented groups. Political discrimination has been shown to powerfully motivate groups such as African Americans, Asian-Americans, and Latinos to become politically engaged (e.g., Barreto & Woods, 2005; Pantoja et al., 2001; Parker, 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramirez, 2007). The political activism displayed by Muslim-Americas in the face of discriminatory post-911 policies is not an exceptional reaction. What may be distinctive is how much influence Muslim-Americans vis-à-vis other groups can attain in the political arena through traditional avenues of political participation.

As for the relationship between societal discrimination and withdrawal from mainstream politics, there is evidence to suggest that other groups may also be adversely impacted. Epidemiological studies have exhibited a strong association between various interpersonal, societal discrimination and negative psychological outcomes among Asians (Noh et al., 1999), African Americans (Banks et al., 2006), Native Americans (Whitbeck et al., 2002), and Latinos (Finch et al., 2000). Again, there is nothing about the Muslim experience that appears to be exceptional or out of the ordinary. Nevertheless, the above studies did not analyze the nexus between societal discrimination and sociopolitical behavior. Their focus was rather on psychological effect. However, one study in particular did focus on interpersonal discrimination and political behavior, providing support for the outlined theory. Schildkraut (2005) found that Latinos who were treated with less respect than others, received poor service at restaurants or stores, or were called names or insulted were less likely to register and turnout than those who did not experiences such day-to-day, societal discrimination. While the questions utilized by Schildkraut are different than the ones used in this study, they tap into the same concept delineated in this article and reveal a similar outcome. Outside of this study, measures of societal

---

[29] Regression results are available upon request.

discrimination are either too vague or have been ignored all together, necessitating further investigation into how societal discrimination in particular impacts the political behavior of other groups. Because discrimination is extremely hurtful, we should expect to see individuals from other groups to be adversely effected by societal exclusion. What may be different is how effectively groups can reach out to and assist the most alienated individuals so that they too can find value in democratic engagement despite their negative interpersonal encounters. Such effectiveness is undoubtedly bound to the historical legacy of the group, its size, and national and local resources that pertain to these issues.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

Abramson, P. R., & Aldrich, J. H. (1982). The decline of electoral participation in America. *The American Political Science Review*, *76*(3), 502–521.

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ayers, J. W., & Hofstetter, C. R. (2008). American Muslim political participation following 9/11: Religious belief, political resources, social structures, and political awareness. *Politics and Religion*, *1*(01), 2–26.

Banks, K., Kohn-Wood, L., & Spencer, M. (2006). An examination of the African American experience of everyday discrimination and symptoms of psychological distress. *Community Mental Health Journal*, *42*(6), 555–570.

Barone, D. F., Maddux, J. E., & Snyder, C. R. (1997). *Social cognitive psychology: History and current domains*. New York, NY: Plenum Press.

Barreto, M., & Woods, N. (2005). The Anti-Latino political context and its impact on GOP detachment and increasing Latino voter turnout in Los Angeles county. In G. Segura & S. Bowler (Eds.), *Diversity in democracy: Minority representation in the United States* (pp. 148–169). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, *77*(1), 135–149.

Burns, N., Schlozman, K. L., & Verba, S. (1997). The public consequences of private inequality: Family life and citizen participation. *American Political Science Review*, *91*(2), 373–389.

Cainkar, L. (2002). No longer invisible: Arab and Muslim exclusion after September 11. *MERIP Middle East Report*, *32*(224), 22–29.

Campbell, A. L. (2003). Participatory reactions to policy threats: Senior citizens and the defense of Social Security and Medicare. *Political Behavior*, *25*(1), 29–49.

Campbell A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American voter*. New York, NY: Wiley.

Cho, W., Gimpel, J., & Wu, T. (2006). Clarifying the role of SES in political participation: Policy threat and Arab American mobilization. *Journal of Politics*, *68*(4), 977–991.

Dahl, R. A. (1961). *Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dana, K., Barreto, M. A., & Oskooii, K. (2011). Mosques as American institutions: Mosque attendance, religiosity and integration into the political system among American Muslims. *Religions*, *2*(4), 504–524.

Dawson, M. C. (1994). *Behind the mule: Race and class in African-American politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dion K. L., & Earn, B. M. (1975). The phenomenology of being a target of prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *32*(5), 944–950.

Edgell, P., Gerteis, J., & Hartmann, D. (2006). Atheists as "other": Moral boundaries and cultural membership in American Society. *American Sociological Review*, *71*(2), 211–234.

Esposito, J. L. (1999). *The Islamic threat: Myth or reality?* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Essed, P. (1991). *Understanding everyday racism: An interdisciplinary theory*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Finch, B. K., Kolody, B., & Vega, W. A. (2000). Perceived discrimination and depression among Mexican-origin adults in California. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *41*(3), 295–313.

Gamson, W. A. (1968). *Power and discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

Garcia, J. A. (2003). *Latino politics in America: Community, culture, and interests*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gibbons F. X., Gerrard, M., Cleveland, M. J., Wills, T. A., & Brody, G. (2004). Perceived discrimination and substance use in African American parents and their children: A panel study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*(4), 517–529.

Greenwald, G. (2012). NYPD spying program aimed at Muslims. *Salon Politics News*. Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/2012/02/22/nypd_spying_program_aimed_at_muslims/

Guterbock, T. M., & London, B. (1983). Race, political orientation, and participation: An empirical test of four competing theories. *American Sociological Review*, *48*(4), 439–453.

Guthrie, B. J., Young, A. M., Williams, D. R., Boyd, C. J., & Kintner, E. K. (2002). African American girls' smoking habits and day-to-day experiences with racial discrimination. *Nursing Research*, *51*, 183–190.

Haney-Lopez, I. (2000). The social construction of race. In R. Delgado & J. Stefancic (Eds.), *Critical race theory: The cutting edge* (pp. 141–151). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Harris, F. (1994). Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African American political activism. *Journal of Politics*, *1*, 42–68.

Howell, S., & Shryock, A. (2003). Cracking down on diaspora: Arab Detroit and America's war on terror. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *76*(3), 443–462.

Jalalzai, F. (2009). The politics of Muslims in America. *Politics and Religion*, *2*(02), 163–199.Bottom of Form

Jamal, A. (2005). The political participation and engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque involvement and group consciousness. *American Politics Research*, *33*, 521–544.

Jost, J. T. (1995). Negative illusions: Conceptual clarification and psychological evidence concerning false consciousness. *Political Psychology*, *16*(2), 397–424.

Kim, J. (1999). The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. *Politics & Society*, *27*(1), 1–34.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *40*(3), 414–431.

Krieger N. (1999). Embodying inequality: A review of concepts, measures, and methods for studying health consequences of discrimination. *International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation*, *29*(2), 295–352.

Leary, M. R., Terdal, S. K., Tambor, E. S., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, *68*(3), 518–530.

Leonard, K. I. (2003). *Muslims in the United States: The state of research*. New York, NY: Russell Sage.

Maciejewski, P. K., Prigerson, H. G., & Mazure, C. M. (2000). Self-efficacy as a mediator between stressful life events and depressive symptoms. Differences based on history of prior depression. *British Journal of Psychiatry: Journal of Mental Science*, *176*, 373–378.

Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Marx, G. T. (1967). *Protest and prejudice: A study of belief in the black community*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Matthews, D. R., & Prothro, J. (1966). *Negroes and the new southern politics*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Mays, V. M., Cochran, S. D., & Barnes, N. W. (2007). Race, race-based discrimination, and health outcomes among African Americans. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *58*(1), 201–225.

McAdam, D. (1982). *Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

McCluskey, M. R., Deshpande, S., Shah, D. V., & McLeod, D. M. (2004). The efficacy gap and political participation: When political influence fails to meet expectations. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *16*(4), 437–455.

McDaniel, E. L. (2008). *Politics in the pews: The political mobilization of Black churches*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Michelson, M. R. (2000). Political efficacy and electoral participation of Chicago Latinos. *Social Science Quarterly*, *81*(1), 136–150.

Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group consciousness and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, *25*(3), 494–511.

Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (2004). Threat as a motivator of political activism: A field experiment. *Political Psychology*, *25*(4), 507–523.

Morgan, D. (2011). Muslims face rising discrimination: Official. *Reuters Online US Edition*. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-usa-muslims-idUSTRE72S4K720110329.

Ngai, M. M. (2004). *Impossible subjects: Illegal aliens and the making of modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Noh, S., Beiser, M., Kaspar, V., Hou, F., & Rummens, J. (1999). Perceived racial discrimination, depression, and coping: A study of Southeast Asian refugees in Canada. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *40*(3), 385–396.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. 1986. *Racial formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1980s*. New York, NY: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 20 vols. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989. Retrieved from http://www.oed.com/

Pantoja, A., Ramirez, R., & Segura, G. (2001). Citizens by choice, voters by necessity: Patterns in political mobilization by naturalized Latinos. *Political Research Quarterly*, *54*(4), 729–750.

Paradies, Y. (2006). A systematic review of empirical research on self-reported racism and health. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, *35*(4), 888–901.

Parker C. S. (2009). When politics becomes protest: Black veterans and political activism in the postwar South. *Journal of Politics*, *71*(1), 113–131.

Pascoe E. A., & Richman, L. S. (2009). Perceived discrimination and health: A meta-analytic review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *135*(4), 531–554.

Pew Research Center. (2011). The future of the global Muslim population. *Religion & Public Life: Polling and Analysis*. Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2010). *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Ramakrishnan, S. K. (2005). *Democracy in immigrant America: Changing demographics and political participation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Ramirez, R. (2007). Segmented mobilization: Latino nonpartisan get-out-the-vote efforts in the 2000 general election. *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, *44*(3), 155–175.

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). *Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America*. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Said, E. W. (1997). *Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Sanchez, G. (2006). The role of group consciousness in political participation among Latinos in the United States. *American Politics Research*, *34*(4), 427–450.

Schildkraut, D. (2005). The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: The role of identity and perceptions of discrimination. *Political Behavior*, *27*(3), 285–312.

Serrano, R. (2002). Hate crimes against Muslims soar, report says. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/26/nation/na-hate26.

Shaheen, J. G. (2001). *Reel bad Arabs: How Hollywood vilifies a people*. New York, NY: Olive Branch Press.

Smith, R. (1993). Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The multiple traditions in America. *American Political Science Review*, *87*(3), 549–566.

Smith, H. M., & Betz, N. E. (2002). An examination of efficacy and esteem pathways to depression in young adulthood. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *49*(4), 438–448.

Stokes, A. K. (2003). Latino group consciousness and political participation. *American Politics Research*, *31*(4), 361–378.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel and L.W. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations*. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Tate, K. (1993). *From protest to politics: The new Black voters in American elections*. New York, NY: Russell Sage.

Verba, S. (2003). Would the dream of political equality turn out to be a nightmare? *Perspectives on Politics*, *1*(4), 663–679.

Verba, S., Burns, N., & Schlozman, K. L. (2001). *The Private roots of public life: Gender and the paradox of political inequality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: a seven-nation comparison*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Verkuyten, M. (1998). Perceived discrimination and self-esteem among ethnic minority adolescents. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *138*(4), 479–493.

Wajahat A., Clifton, E., Duss, M., Fang, L., Keyes, S., & Shakir, F. (2011). Fear Inc.: The roots of the Islamophobia Network in America. *Center for American Progress*. Retrieved from http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/islamophobia.html

Williams, D. R., & Mohammed, S. A. (2009). Discrimination and racial disparities in health: evidence and needed research. *Journal of Behavioral Medicine*, *32*(1), 20–47.

Whitbeck, L. B., McMorris, B. J., Hoyt, D. R., Stubben, J. D., & LaFromboise, T. (2002). Perceived discrimination, traditional practices, and depressive Symptoms among American Indians in the upper Midwest. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *43*(4), 400–418.

Wong, J. (2006). *Democracy's promise: Immigrants & American civic institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). *Who votes?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Table 1. Registration and Turnout by Political Participation (Pew)

Table 2. Political Participation by Political Discrimination (MAPOS)

Table 3. Electoral Participation by Societal Discrimination (Pew)

Table 4. Ingroup Involvement by Societal Discrimination (Pew)

Table 5. Ingroup Involvement by Political Discrimination (Pew)

Table 6. Summary of Variables, 2007 Pew Survey

Table 7. Summary of Variables, 2007–2008 MAPOS Survey